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THE MOST DANGEROUS GAME: U.S. 
OPPOSITION TO THE CULTURAL 
EXCEPTION 
INTRODUCTION 
n the 2004 documentary film Mondovino, filmmaker Jonathan Las-
siter explored a raging conflict in the increasingly globalized wine 
industry.1 At the heart of the conflict is the concept of terroir, which re-
fers to the distinct tastes and aromas that result from the particular soil, 
climate, and growing methods of the different regions in which wine is 
made.2 These particularized attributes are critical in maintaining the di-
versity of wines that occur throughout the world.3 In their absence, wines 
from Napa will become indistinguishable from those of Bordeaux.4 
The local growers and wine aficionados interviewed in the film see 
two major threats to the continued existence of their cherished terroir.5 
First, as multinational wine companies have accumulated vineyards 
throughout the world’s wine-growing regions, they have streamlined 
growing procedures.6 Second, a handful of figures have come to hold 
enormous influence in the global wine industry, and their tastes and pref-
erences have increasingly dictated the growing methods of winemakers 
all around the world.7 For example, an incredibly influential critic’s 
fondness for oak has led winemakers to store their wine in oak barrels, 
thus drowning out the local characteristics of wines that developed over 
the course of centuries.8 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. MONDOVINO (THINKFilm 2004). For a review, see A.O. Scott, Amid the Globali-
zation of Wine, A Plea for Its Individuality and Expression of History, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
23, 2005, at E5. 
 2. MONDOVINO, supra note 1. Writing about the global industry of wine, Sid Perkins 
noted, “Today’s diversity—from Bordeaux to merlot, from champagne to chardonnay—
reflects the complex interactions between a region’s soil, topography, climate, grape vari-
eties, agricultural practices, and wine-making techniques, all of which can inextricably 
link particular wines to particular places. Little wonder, then, that wine sometimes is 
referred to as ‘liquid geography.’” Sid Perkins, Global Vineyard: Can Technology Take 
On a Warming Climate?, SCIENCE NEWS, May 29, 2004, at 347. 
 3. MONDOVINO, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. While the critic in question is American, not all of the divisions fall neatly on 
an American/rest of the world axis. Another prominent subject of the film, a wine con-
sultant who advises wineries on how to market their wine on the global marketplace, is 
actually French. 
I 
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These figures see these trends not just as a threat to local products, but 
as an assault on their cultural identity.9 Because cultural identities have 
become so intertwined with nationalism, any threat to the customs or 
cultural products by which a nation has come to define itself can actually 
be seen as a threat to the nation itself.10 As Neal Rosenthal, a New York 
wine importer, said of the battle between the forces of globalization, “It’s 
not the traditionalists versus the modernists. It’s the collaborators against 
the resistance.”11 Under this view, when civilization is at stake, all politi-
cal avenues should be pursued, including the suspension of free trade 
rules.12 When threatened with the prospect of an American corporation 
purchasing a large vineyard in Bordeaux, a French city elected a Com-
munist mayor who successfully thwarted the bid.13 
However, those at the forefront of the globalization of the wine indus-
try view the ferocious response mainly as a result of jealousy on behalf 
of growers who are losing out in the competition for the global market-
place.14 In their view, it is the consumers who are driving the changes in 
the industry, and they see themselves as democratizing forces in the 
once-aristocratic world of wine.15 In dismissing their objections, a Bor-
deaux executive referred to the local growers and aficionados as the 
“ayatollahs of terroir.”16 
The ferocity of the debate mainly results from the pitting of culture and 
commerce, two dominant forces of the modern world, in direct opposi-
tion to each other.17 Nations have come to define themselves by their 
respective cultures, and when culture is threatened, many people feel that 
the suspension of free trade laws seems like a small price to pay for its 
                                                                                                                                     
 9. See id. Many of the French growers in the film discuss how the growing methods 
in their locales have remained remarkably constant since the Middle Ages. 
 10. See Judith Beth Prowda, U.S. Dominance in the “Marketplace of Culture” and 
the French “Cultural Exception”, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 193, 199–200 (1997). 
 11. MONDOVINO, supra note 1. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. Obviously, with existing free trade agreements between France and the U.S., a 
corporation would normally have the right to purchase any business it would like. 
 14. Id. The critic, Robert Parker, seems to take particular pride in the idea of French 
wine families, whose involvement in the industry sometimes dates over centuries, trying 
to cater to his American tastes. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. As Judith Beth Prowda noted, “The debate over the ‘cultural exception’ 
juxtaposes the European notion of the necessity for some form of cultural protectionism 
and the profound American belief in freedom of expression, choice, and what Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes termed the ‘free trade in ideas.’ Justice Holmes’ theory is based 
on the notion that the First Amendment prohibits suppression of ideas. ‘The marketplace 
of ideas’ will determine the truth of any competing idea.’” Prowda, supra note 10, at 208. 
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preservation.18 On the other hand, free traders see anti-protectionist trade 
laws as the backbone of modern peace and prosperity, and that while lift-
ing tariffs and other restrictive measures may harm domestic industries, 
allowing exceptions for particular fields could threaten to swallow all 
international trade law.19 
The United States has injected itself into this fierce debate by becom-
ing the foremost opponent in the world of the “cultural exception.”20 
Generally speaking, the “cultural exception” refers to the exception to 
the national treatment principle in international trade law, under which 
states can enact protectionist trade policies to protect domestic cultural 
products when those protectionist measures would otherwise be held il-
legal under international trade law.21 
The U.S. government, with lobbying from the entertainment industry, 
has adopted the policy of fiercely resisting any recognition of the cultural 
exception in international law and fighting for the application of free 
trade principles to all cultural products.22 It was in response to the push 
by the U.S. to include cultural products in the free trade provisions of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) Agreement, part of 
the main framework of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), that the 
cultural exception was born.23 Even despite that failure, the U.S. contin-
ued to fight cultural protectionist measures through the WTO dispute 
resolution process.24 Simultaneously, the U.S. has continued to push for 
the inclusion of cultural products in the negotiation of bilateral trade 
                                                                                                                                     
 18. See MONDOVINO, supra note 1. Some parallels can be made with Michael 
Walzer’s “supreme emergency” doctrine. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 
251–268 (3d ed. 2000). Essentially, Walzer argues that when the continued existence of 
nations are truly in peril, those nations can suspend observance of international laws re-
garding the indiscriminate bombing of cities and targeting of civilians. See id. 
 19. See MONDOVINO, supra note 1. 
 20. See Christopher M. Bruner, Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and 
the Future of Trade on Cultural Products, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 351 (2007). 
 21. See Daisuke Beppu, When Cultural Value Justifies Protectionism: Interpreting 
The Language Of The GATT To Find A Limited Cultural Exception To The National 
Treatment Principle, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2008). While many early disputes 
have focused on film and television, there are many proponents for including products 
that are inextricably linked with their regions, such as wine and cheese, within the scope 
of the cultural exception. Id. 
 22. See C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78 
N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2000). 
 23. See W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business?: Free Trade and 
Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 105, 106–07 (1995). 
 24. See Michael Hahn, A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and 
International Trade Law, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 515, 529–30 (2007). 
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agreements with smaller nations.25 The U.S. also fiercely resisted the 
adoption of the UNESCO Convention, which loudly proclaims the prin-
ciples of state sovereignty over all cultural matters.26 
In line with this policy, the U.S. filed a WTO complaint against China 
in 2007, alleging that certain Chinese laws placed restrictions on trading 
and distribution rights of American companies hoping to sell cultural 
products, such as books, films, and music, and that these restrictions 
were violations of China’s obligations under international law.27 In Chi-
na—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, the WTO 
Panel ruled in favor of the U.S., finding that China could not require 
American businesses to go through a middleman, normally a state-owned 
company, when seeking to distribute cultural products to the Chinese 
market.28 After China appealed the ruling, the WTO Appellate Body up-
held the vast majority of the Panel’s findings.29 
Key figures in Washington hailed the decision, seeing it as a major 
vindication of U.S. policy.30 Ron Kirk, the U.S. trade representative, 
claimed the WTO decision as a major victory, saying, “These findings 
are an important step toward ensuring market access for legitimate U.S. 
products in the Chinese market, as well as ensuring market access for 
U.S. exporters and distributors of those products.”31 He then vowed to 
continue U.S. policy, stating, “We will work tirelessly so that American 
companies and workers can fully realize the market opening benefits that 
this decision signals.”32 
Hollywood executives echoed the government’s praise of the deci-
sion.33 Dan Glickman of the Motion Picture Association of America ex-
pressed his belief that the decision would further open up the Chinese 
market.34 When speaking of a Chinese quota of foreign films that was not 
                                                                                                                                     
 25. See Bruner, supra note 20, at 376. 
 26. Id. at 397–400. 
 27. See Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 1.1, 
WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter China Panel Report]. 
 28. See id. ¶¶ 4.4–4.5, 8.1, 8.2. 
 29. See WTO Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Prod-
ucts, ¶ 414, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China Appellate Report]. 
 30. See Keith Bradsher, W.T.O. Rules Against China’s Limits on Imports, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2009, at A1. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
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at issue in the WTO panel decision, Glickman stated, “It’s hard for me to 
believe that the import quota, which has been in effect for 10 years, will 
be there in perpetuity with this decision.”35 Glickman saw the decision as 
a stepping-stone towards the eventual abolition of film quotas and other 
regulations placed on cultural products.36 Proponents of U.S. policy thus 
see the decision as a major breakthrough, and believe that continued re-
sistance to any recognition of the rights of states to regulate culture will 
eventually culminate in the total extinction of the cultural exception.37 
This Note argues that despite the ruling in its favor, the U.S. policy of 
full-fledged opposition to the cultural exception is misguided. There is an 
inherent difficulty in both defining and valuating the concept of culture 
in a legal framework, and these difficulties make further litigation re-
garding cultural matters incredibly risky. The WTO decision itself sug-
gests that proponents of the cultural exception may have the upper hand 
in future cases.38 First, the decision suggests that the UNESCO Conven-
tion may actually alter some rights and obligations of WTO members.39 
Second, China’s invocation of a “public morals” defense, while unsuc-
cessful in this case, may prove to be an avenue in the future for states to 
regulate culture consistently with their WTO obligations.40 
In light of the inherent risk of litigating culture, the U.S. should instead 
negotiate with the international community to codify a limited version of 
the cultural exception at the WTO. In exchange for recognizing the ex-
ception, the U.S. should push for a medium-based definition of the term, 
in which the applicability of the exception depends on the medium in 
which cultural products are displayed to consumers, and not on an analy-
sis of the cultural value of the goods and products. Such an approach 
would place clear limits on the scope of the cultural exception, and 
would prevent the more radical provisions of the UNESCO Convention41 
from affecting international trade law. 
Part I of this Note explores the origins of the cultural exception, and 
analyzes a prior WTO decision which displays the body’s previous un-
willingness to consider the cultural value of products in their legal anal-
                                                                                                                                     
 35. Id. Glickman did note that he did not think the decision would have a major im-
pact in the immediate future. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See China Panel Report, supra note 27. 
 39. See id. ¶ 7.751. 
 40. See id. ¶ 7.863. 
 41. See Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Ex-
pressions, Oct. 20, 2005, UNESCO Doc. No. CLT-2005/Convention Diversite-Cult. 
Rev., available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf [hereinaf-
ter UNESCO Convention]. 
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yses. Part II examines the UNESCO Convention, a 2005 treaty which 
seeks to counteract the lack of recognition of the cultural exception at the 
WTO, and discusses its possible effects on WTO rights and obligations. 
Part III looks at the WTO’s China decision in detail, with particular em-
phasis on China’s invocation of the UNESCO Convention and its “public 
morals” defense. 
I. PRODUCTS OR CULTURE?: THE WTO AND THE CULTURAL EXCEPTION 
A. Culture and the National Treatment Principle 
The National Treatment principle is one of two foundational principles 
that apply across the WTO regime42 and it is crucial in understanding the 
cultural exception. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 
(“GATT 1947”) provides that “[t]he products of the territory of any con-
tracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other inter-
nal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, 
to like domestic products.”43 The National Treatment principle prohibits 
a member from discriminating against other members in favor of its own 
goods and services.44 This principle requires that once goods have 
cleared customs, members must treat foreign goods no less favorably 
than like domestic goods.45 
The cultural exception first arose in the attempts of the U.S. to extend 
the national treatment principle to services as well as products.46 The 
GATT 1947 only governs goods, which essentially means products that 
contain a distinct physical presence.47 In contrast, GATS governs ser-
vices, meaning products that lack physical, tangible properties.48 While 
neither the GATT nor GATS explicitly contain a cultural exception, the 
                                                                                                                                     
 42. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 143 (2008). The other core principle is The Most 
Favored Nation principle, which essentially means that WTO members must give equal 
treatment concerning trade advantages to all other members. No member of the WTO can 
discriminate in favor of or against any other member. The Most Favored Nation and Na-
tional Treatment principles first appeared in GATT 1947, but they are now featured in the 
WTO through GATT 1994, GATS, and TRIPS. Id. 
 43. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III(2), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 44. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 42, at 143. 
 45. Id. at 159. 
 46. See Hahn, supra note 24, at 515–16. 
 47. Id. at 525. 
 48. Id. 
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different natures of the treaties have important consequences.49 The 
GATT automatically applies its national treatments principle to all 
goods, unless there is an express provision explicitly exempting the 
product from the treaty.50 GATS, on the other hand, creates obligations 
much more modest in scope,51 as its national treatment principles are on-
ly granted if and to the extent that states have made specific commit-
ments to liberalize trade in that particular industry.52 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the ratification of 
GATS in the early 1990s, the U.S. pushed hard to include specific com-
mitments to liberalize the entertainment industry as part of the treaty.53 In 
response, the French government pushed for the complete exclusion of 
the industry.54 Ultimately, in an uneasy compromise, the sides essentially 
agreed to disagree, not formally excluding the audiovisual sector from 
GATS, but allowing states to decline to make commitments to liberalize 
trade in the sector, with the understanding that parties would resume ne-
gotiations within five years.55 However, in the ensuing years, very few 
Member States have made commitments with regards to cultural prod-
ucts.56 
                                                                                                                                     
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. For example, weapons are exempted from the GATT under Article XXI. One 
of the original exceptions of GATT 1947 also shows that the original drafters of the 
GATT were aware of the need for sometimes treating cultural products differently. Arti-
cle IV permitted national screen quotas for foreign films, limiting the quotas to those 
existing in October 1947. The exception was limited to movie theaters, however, and was 
subject to further negotiations as to further limitations or their eliminations. The excep-
tion was a response to the huge number of American films that were flooding the Euro-
pean market as a result of the disruption of trade caused by the war. Chi Carmody argues 
that the prominent placement of the exception in the text of GATT displays that the cin-
ema exception was important to the drafters, and that the exception was consistent with 
the drafters’ awareness that one state’s domination of the film industry could pose prob-
lems for international trade. The recognition of this exception for movie theaters may 
seem quite limited, but it seems to reflect a recognition of the need to sometimes address 
culture differently in international trade law, even at a time when the world was much 
more parochial, before globalization transformed so many cultures. Chi Carmody, When 
“Cultural Identity Was Not At Issue”: Thinking About Canada—Certain Measures Con-
cerning Periodicals, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 231, 255 (1999). 
 51. See Hahn, supra note 24, at 531–33. 
 52. See id. at 526. 
 53. See Shao, supra note 23, at 106–08. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Hahn, supra note 24, at 526. 
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The French government celebrated this cultural exception from GATS 
as a major victory for the preservation of French culture,57 but the stand-
ing of the cultural exception in international trade law remained very 
tenuous.58 In ensuing years, the classification of a product as a good or 
service became integral to the ability of states to enact protectionist 
measures against cultural products.59 When a cultural product was recog-
nized as a service, it was likely to fall within the scope of GATS, but 
when recognized as a good, it would likely be engulfed by the all en-
compassing nature of GATT.60 
This situation is further complicated by the fact that products do not 
fall exclusively under either GATT or GATS.61 For instance, while the 
production of a film is considered a service, the physical reel which is 
projected on screens is actually considered a good.62 Thus, even though 
the entertainment industry is not specifically included in GATS, a cultur-
al product may still fall within the scope of GATT even if a party can 
successfully argue that the product constitutes a service.63 Under this le-
gal regime, an analysis known as the “like products” test became incred-
ibly important in determining whether states have the right to impose 
protectionist measures in a given cultural industry.64 
B. Cultural Valuation in the “Like Products” Analysis 
In Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, the WTO 
Panel assessed whether Canada violated national treatment principles by 
imposing a total ban and excise taxes on split-run editions of U.S. maga-
zines.65 In the 1960s, U.S. publishers began to distribute Canadian edi-
                                                                                                                                     
 57. See Alan Riding, The World Trade Agreement: The French Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 1993, at D19. Communications Minister Alain Carignon stated, “This is a great 
and beautiful victory for Europe and for French culture.” Id. However, Jack Lang, the 
former Minister of Culture, phrased the victory in different terms, stating, “It’s not a vic-
tory of one country over another. It’s a victory for art and artists over the commercializa-
tion of culture.” Id. It should be noted that while much of the press coverage at the time 
focused on the French role in negotiations, the backing of the French by other members 
of the European Community was crucial in the establishment of the cultural exception. 
Id. See also Julian Nundy, The GATT Deal: France Sees Itself as Gallant Defender, THE 
INDEPENDENT, Dec. 15, 1993, at 7. 
 58. See Bruner, supra note 20, at 374–76. 
 59. See Hahn, supra note 24, at 531–33. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 526–27. 
 62. Id. at 527. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, ¶¶ 3.3–
3.4, WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Canada Panel Report]. 
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tions of their magazines containing the same editorial content as U.S. 
editions but with advertisements specifically targeted to the Canadian 
market.66 These U.S. editions threatened the advertising revenue of Ca-
nadian periodicals, which in turn led to the collapse of several Canadian 
magazines.67 Fearing the impact of a collapse of the Canadian publishing 
industry on national identity,68 the Canadian government imposed a 
heavy tariff on imported periodicals that contained advertisements di-
rected specifically to the Canadian market.69 In response to an attempt by 
Sports Illustrated in 1993 to get around the tariff by printing the split-run 
editions in Canada, the Canadian government placed an excise tax of 
eighty percent on magazines with more than twenty percent of the same 
editorial content as their home editions and with advertising that did not 
appear in non-Canadian editions of the magazine.70 In assessing whether 
                                                                                                                                     
 66. See id. ¶ 2.2. 
 67. See Carmody, supra note 50, at 279–80. While American publications had been 
attracting Canadian readers for many years, in the 1960s, U.S. periodicals began to intro-
duce split-run editions in Canada in an attempt to increase their advertising revenue. Ad-
vertisers looking to market specifically to Canadian consumers could now buy space in 
popular American magazines, thus threatening the traditional stream of revenue that was 
so vital to the continued existence of Canadian periodicals. Id. 
 68. In 1961, a government commission stated, “[T]he communications of a nation are 
as vital to its life as its defences, and should receive at least as great a measure of national 
protection.” Carmody, supra note 50, at 280. Despite close ties with the U.S., Canada has 
long struggled to maintain its cultural identity in the shadow of its enormous neighbor to 
the south. Describing this problem, Chi Carmody writes: 
Due to its proximity and sheer size, the United States also looms large in eve-
ryday Canadian thinking. A shared border, common language, parallel history, 
and the largest trading relationship in the world mean that Canadians are well 
aware of U.S. current events. The same cannot be said for many Americans 
about Canada. Their ignorance annoys Canadians, who often perceive it as a 
sign of arrogance and a reason to be suspicious of the United States. Moreover 
such unidirectional cultural permeability makes it exceedingly difficult for Ca-
nadians to assert their own cultural autonomy. Not only must Canadians strug-
gle to define who they are in the face of constant competition from cultural im-
agery that is not their own, but Canadian culture does not pose any comparable 
threat to, and hence cannot be leveraged against, the United States. The over-
whelming one-way flow of products, ideas, and interest has served at times to 
sharpen the perception of cultural invasion among Canadians. 
Id. at 278–79. 
 69. Id. at 280–81. Tariff Code 9958 effectively implemented a total ban on the impor-
tation of periodicals which contained advertisements that targeted Canadian audiences 
and did not appear in all editions distributed in the periodical’s home market. See id. 
 70. See Canada Panel Report, supra note 65, ¶¶ 2.6–2.7. 
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the excise tax violated the national treatment principle, the Panel con-
ducted a “like product” analysis.71 
Canada argued that the intellectual content of a magazine must be con-
sidered its prime characteristic, and that the “like product” analysis must 
be conducted in terms of its intellectual content rather than its physical 
characteristics.72 The Canadian government intended for the excise tax to 
create original content by putting news and events through a uniquely 
Canadian filter.73 Canada argued that it was untenable to equate U.S. pe-
riodicals, which virtually ignored Canadian topics, with Canadian period-
icals, which had a strong focus on Canadian affairs and a distinctly Ca-
nadian outlook on international affairs, as “like products.”74 
The U.S. countered that Canada had created artificial distinctions be-
tween otherwise like products based on factors such as the location of 
production, and that these factors were irrelevant in assessing the nature 
of the good.75 The U.S. argued that editorial content was just one of 
many factors that should be assessed when making the “like product” 
comparison.76 The U.S. further suggested that Canada imposed the 
measures mainly to protect its own advertising industry.77 
In an unusual legal analysis, the Panel examined the case of a hypo-
thetical magazine78 and reasoned that there could conceivably be a U.S. 
edition and a Canadian edition of a home and gardening magazine that 
would share a common end use and similar physical properties, natures, 
and qualities.79 In rejecting the Canadian argument, the Panel found that 
editorial content and advertising content, the factors of the excise tax 
definition, were external to the Canadian market and did not relate to any 
inherently Canadian quality of the periodical.80 In analyzing the decision, 
one author noted that the Panel insisted on a degree of specificity that 
culture could simply never provide.81 The Panel refused to engage in the 
analysis needed to recognize the inherent value of particular cultures and 
thus found the different editions of the magazines to be like products.82 
                                                                                                                                     
 71. See id. ¶ 3.60. 
 72. See id. ¶ 3.61. 
 73. See id. ¶ 3.59. An analogy can be made here with the concept of terroir. 
 74. See id. ¶ 3.62. 
 75. See id. ¶ 3.60. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. ¶ 3.72. 
 78. Id. ¶¶ 5.25–5.26. This particular bizarre aspect of the Panel’s opinion should be 
attributed to the difficulty inherent in legally analyzing culture. 
 79. See id. ¶ 5.25. 
 80. See id. ¶ 5.24. 
 81. Carmody, supra note 50, at 295–96. 
 82. See id. 
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Canada appealed the Panel’s findings on the excise tax to the Appellate 
Body of the WTO.83 While the Appellate Body also ruled in favor of the 
U.S., it did so under a completely different analysis, looking at the sub-
stitutability of the different editions of magazines.84 In finding that im-
ported split-run periodicals and domestic split-run periodicals were di-
rectly substitutable, the Appellate Body looked to see whether they were 
in competition with each other in the relevant market. The Appellate 
Body noted that while certain periodicals may not be directly substituta-
ble because of a difference in topic, whether or not a magazine had Ca-
nadian content was not relevant in assessing whether a periodical is sub-
stitutable.85 
Because of the WTO’s purely economic focus, its panels refused to 
take non-economic considerations into account in their legal analyses of 
whether states were violating national treatment principles.86 Thus, many 
measures states traditionally took to protect their local cultural industries 
might not survive the WTO dispute resolution process.87 While many 
ambiguities remained in defining culture, it seemed quite clear that ar-
guments about the cultural values of products under the “like products” 
analysis were doomed to fail.88 Because many states felt that the WTO 
was ignoring the cultural value of products that were so important to 
their respective national and cultural identities, these states turned to the 
United Nations in 2005 in an attempt to reassert their sovereignty over 
cultural matters.89 
II. THE UNESCO CONVENTION 
While France had been inextricably linked with the cultural exception 
during the Uruguay Rounds negotiations, the ratification process of the 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions was a world-wide phenomenon.90 With its over-
whelming popularity, the world community negotiated and ratified the 
treaty with remarkable speed.91 Despite its nearly complete isolation, the 
                                                                                                                                     
 83. WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodi-
cals, WT/DS31/AB/R, (June 30, 1997), at 2 [hereinafter Canada Appellate Report]. 
 84. See id. at 29. 
 85. See id. at 28. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Bruner, supra note 20, at 357. 
 90. See Alan Riding, Entr’acte: Next Lone U.S. Dissent: Cultural Diversity Pact, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005. 
 91. See id. 
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U.S. still opposed the treaty in its entirety and fought hard against its rati-
fication.92 
France and Canada, the original sponsors of the convention, aimed to 
remove all cultural trade disputes from the jurisdiction of the World 
Trade Organization and to create a dispute resolution process under 
UNESCO.93 In a partial victory, the U.S. managed to fend off this 
movement, successfully pushing for the inclusion of a provision that 
states that the convention “cannot modify rights and obligations of the 
parties under any other treaties to which they are parties.”94 While its 
standing under international law remains unclear, the Convention is 
clearly an endorsement by states of their sovereignty over cultural mat-
ters.95 
After being adopted by the UNESCO General Conference on October 
20, 2005, the Convention provoked a broad array of reactions, ranging 
from indifference, to over the top excitement,96 to fierce resistance.97 
These varied reactions can be attributed to the Convention’s many sub-
stantive and procedural contradictions.98 The Convention appears at first 
sight to be nothing more than a litany of vague platitudes about the in-
herent value of cultural diversity.99 Yet to others, the Convention repre-
sents a treaty fully recognized in international law, and while perhaps 
having little impact upon clear existing international obligations, con-
tains the potential to transform the recognition of the cultural exception 
under international law.100 This Section examines both the provisions of 
the Convention and its impact upon international law, arguing that de-
spite the provisions limiting its applicability, it still has many implica-
tions for the obligations and rights of its parties. 
                                                                                                                                     
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Alison James, Gaul Wall Won’t Stall Hollywood Anytime Soon, VARIETY, Oct. 31, 
2005, at 8. 
 96. See Bruner, supra note 20, at 400–02. For example, a Canadian government min-
ister described the Convention as “on an equal footing with other international treaties,” 
and called it “a great day for the cultural community.” Id. 
 97. Id. at 400–03. 
 98. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 41. 
 99. See id. art. 1. 
 100. One such provision of the Convention states, “Being aware that cultural diversity 
creates a rich and varied world, which increases the range of choices and nurtures human 
capacities and values, and therefore is a mainspring for sustainable development for 
communities, peoples, and nations . . . .” Id. pmbl. 
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A. A Proclamation of Sovereignty 
Throughout its text, the Convention announces and reaffirms an in-
credibly broad mandate for state sovereignty over the regulation and sub-
sidization of cultural industries.101 One of the stated objectives of the 
Convention is “to reaffirm the sovereign rights of States to maintain, 
adopt, and implement policies and measures that they deem appropriate 
for the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions 
on their territory.”102 The Convention announces “the sovereign right to 
adopt measures and policies to protect and promote the diversity of cul-
tural expressions within their territory” to be one of its eight guiding 
principles.103 This language gives a broad mandate to governments to 
enact any protectionist measures it deems necessary, as long as the 
measures relate to the cultural sphere.104 This assertion of sovereignty, 
considering the enormous difficulties in defining culture and the seeming 
authorization of states to define culture themselves, must be seen as a 
rejection of WTO free trade principles in cultural industries.105 
B. Defining Culture 
The Convention attempts to create an incredibly broad notion of cul-
ture based on the inherent cultural value of things,106 but does not pro-
vide a working definition of “culture.”107 The Convention circularly de-
fines “cultural content” as referring “to the symbolic meaning, artistic 
dimension and cultural values that originate from or express cultural 
identities.”108 This definition does not limit cultural content to products 
traditionally recognized as cultural, such as books, films, or music,109 and 
would seem to allow for the inclusion of national and regional food 
products, such as wine and cheese.110 
The Convention also seeks to remove the distinction between goods 
and services that is so important at the WTO.111 The Convention defines 
“cultural activities, goods and services” to be 
                                                                                                                                     
 101. See id. 
 102. Id. art. 1(h). 
 103. Id. art. 2(2). 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. art. 4(2). 
 107. See id. art. 4. 
 108. Id. art. 4(2). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. art 4(4). 
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those activities, goods and services, which at the time they are consid-
ered as a specific attribute, use or purpose, embody or convey cultural 
expressions, irrespective of the commercial value they may have. Cul-
tural activities may be an end in themselves, or they may contribute to 
the production of cultural goods and services.112 
This language seems to reject any separate legal analysis for the produc-
tion of cultural products.113 
C. The Means for Protecting Culture 
The Convention provides a broad mandate for states to take measures 
that they deem important for protecting culture.114 Included in such 
measures are “regulatory measures aimed at protecting and promoting 
diversity of cultural expressions.”115 Because of the Convention’s broad 
definition of culture, almost any measure could conceivably fit into this 
provision.116 
The Convention then provides a non-exclusive list of specific measures 
that are acceptable.117 The list includes such relatively uncontroversial 
measures as the creation and funding of public institutions to support 
culture118 and public broadcasting.119 The Convention endorses 
measures that, in an appropriate manner, provide opportunities for do-
mestic cultural activities, goods and services among all those available 
within the national territory for the creation, production, dissemination, 
distribution and enjoyment of such domestic cultural activities, goods 
and services, including provisions relating to the language used for 
such activities, goods and services.120 
The broad language of this provision seems to explicitly endorse the use 
of quotas and other regulations designed to protect the market for domes-
tic productions, and it does not set any limits upon its use.121 The Con-
vention further endorses the use of subsidies to promote cultural goods, 
                                                                                                                                     
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. art. 6(1). 
 115. Id. art. 6(2)(a). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. art. 6(2). 
 118. Id. art. 6(2)(f). Article 6(2)(e) also allows measures to encourage non-profit or-
ganizations, which likely would include public subsidies for such organizations. Id. art. 
6(2)(e). 
 119. See id. art. 6(2)(h). 
 120. Id. art. 6(2)(b). 
 121. See id. 
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services, and activities.122 The text of the UNESCO Convention provides 
incredibly broad powers to states when regulating culture and explicitly 
authorizes many measures that would likely violate WTO obligations.123 
D. Rights, Obligations, and Article 20 
However, the UNESCO Convention, although binding,124 imposes 
very few obligations on its parties.125 Instead, the Convention formulates 
an extensive list of measures that parties have the right to take when pro-
tecting and promoting cultural diversity.126 When a right conflicts with 
an existing obligation arising from another instrument of international 
law, the obligation will generally take precedence.127 This aspect of the 
Convention has made commentators dismiss its importance, finding that 
its affirmation of state sovereignty over cultural matters, while sounding 
revolutionary, actually rings hollow.128 
The Convention also seems to negate any impact it may have on inter-
national law with one provision.129 Article 20(2) states, “Nothing in this 
Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and obligations of 
the Parties under any other treaties to which they are parties.”130 This 
provision seems to validate any previous treaties or trade agreements 
ratified before the Convention, such as the WTO regime, in which states 
agreed to cede their sovereign rights to impose protectionist measures.131 
Considering that most states are parties to the WTO, and that most WTO 
                                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. art. 6(2)(d). 
 123. See id. art. 6. 
 124. Mira Burri-Nenova, Trade Versus Culture in the Digital Environment: An Old 
Conflict in Need of a New Definition, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 27. Despite any confusion 
caused by the use of the word “convention,” the UNESCO Convention is a treaty and is 
binding under international law. Id. 
 125. Id. at 22. 
 126. Id. at 23. 
 127. See Bruner, supra note 20, at 405. 
 128. See Burri-Nenova, supra note 124, at 22–25. Burri-Nenova writes, “Thus, where-
as the Parties could do many things, they are not obligated to undertake any concrete and 
specific action.” Id. at 22. After noting that the only punishment for non-compliance with 
the Convention envisaged is a state being criticized by the Intergovernmental Committee 
or Conference of Parties, Burri-Nenova writes, “[W]hile such reporting exercises have 
proven advantageous in different settings, they are unlikely to have any value here, since 
. . . there exist neither any implementation criteria, nor any threat of sanctions.” Id. at 23. 
 129. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 41, art. 20. 
 130. Id. art. 20(2). 
 131. See id. Writing in 2006, Michael Hahn stated, “This article shows that the Diver-
sity Convention, while an important step towards the recognition of cultural diversity as 
an internationally recognized public choice of states, does not affect their rights and obli-
gations as such under WTO law.” Hahn, supra note 24, at 517. 
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case law seems to indicate that cultural products will not be treated dif-
ferently than other products,132 Article 20(2) seems to completely negate 
the Convention’s bold calls for state sovereignty.133 While declarations of 
the inherent value of cultural diversity may sound appealing, domestic 
cultural industries would be just as vulnerable to international competi-
tion as any industry in a WTO jurisdiction.134 
However, another provision in Article 20 also claims that the Conven-
tion should not be subordinated to any other treaty.135 Article 20(1) 
states, “[W]hen interpreting and applying the other treaties to which they 
are parties or when entering into other international obligations, Parties 
shall take into account the relevant provisions of this Convention.”136 
How can these two seemingly contradictory provisions of Article 20 be 
reconciled? 
One commentator argues that the Culture Convention is best under-
stood not as altering existing obligations under international trade law, 
but as enhancing the negotiating positions of states as they enter into fu-
ture trade agreements.137 Under his reading of Article 20, with respect to 
pre-existing international obligations, the Convention requires only that 
parties to the Convention make a good faith effort to comply with their 
obligations.138 When an existing obligation arising under the WTO (or 
any other trade regime or treaty, for that matter) conflicts directly with 
obligations under the Convention, the WTO obligation will prevail, and 
the party will not violate its duty to make a good faith effort to comply 
with the Convention.139 However, the importance of the Convention 
comes into play when states enter into agreements with new international 
obligations.140 By asserting their duty to make a good effort to comply 
                                                                                                                                     
 132. See Bruner, supra note 20, at 407. 
 133. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 41, art. 20(2). 
 134. See Bruner, supra note 20, at 376–78. As the author notes, because of the relative 
ease of negotiating a bilateral agreement, as opposed to a multilateral agreement, the 
United States has focused on negotiating the liberalization of cultural markets in bilateral 
treaties, often with smaller nations with little bargaining power. Id. 
 135. UNESCO Convention, supra note 41, art. 20(1). 
 136. Id. art. 20(1)(b). 
 137. Bruner, supra note 20, at 405. 
 138. Id. at 405–06. 
 139. Id. at 406–07. In support of his contention, Bruner notes the similarities in word-
ing between Article 20(2) of the Convention and Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which provides that “[w]hen a treaty specifies that it is subject to, 
or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provi-
sions of that other treaty prevail.” Id. at 406. 
 140. Id. at 407. Bruner notes that while Article XIX of GATS requires that parties 
enter into successive rounds of negotiations to achieve a progressively higher level of 
liberalization, it also contains a limiting provision which recognizes national policy ob-
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with the Convention, smaller states can enhance their bargaining position 
with larger states.141 Thus, the Convention can be interpreted as being 
most influential in areas of international trade law where states have not 
yet made commitments.142 
This Note argues that the Convention may also prove to be highly in-
fluential when the exact scope of states’ obligations remains uncertain, 
particularly with regards to the WTO’s rarely used “public morals” de-
fense. While Article 20 does place important limitations on the applica-
bility of the UNESCO Convention, the Convention’s broad definition of 
culture and its bold call for sovereignty over cultural matters can still 
transform the recognition of state sovereignty over cultural matters in 
international law.143 
III. THE UNESCO CONVENTION AND THE PUBLIC MORALS 
DEFENSE AT THE WTO 
Despite its ruling in favor of the U.S., the WTO analysis in China—
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products strongly suggests 
that U.S. policy regarding the cultural exception remains extremely 
risky.144 In its report, the WTO Panel found that the Chinese government 
had violated international trade rules by limiting the importation of 
books, films, and music.145 China had placed restrictions on foreign 
companies hoping to distribute these types of cultural products within 
China, forcing them to distribute their products through a limited number 
of corporations, many of which were state-owned.146 The Panel found 
                                                                                                                                     
jectives as justifying an exemption from the process of liberalization, and the Convention 
endorses the recognition of cultural policies as national policy objectives. Id. at 407–08. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 41. 
 144. See China Panel Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 4.4–4.7, 7.863, 8.1, 8.2. Because the 
Appellate Body largely upheld the Panel’s findings with respect to the application of the 
public morals exception, this Section focuses mostly on the Panel Report. See China Ap-
pellate Report, supra note 29, ¶¶ 336–37. Reference is made to the Appellate Body’s 
conclusions or analysis whenever they differ in any material respect from the Panel Re-
port. 
 145. Bradsher, supra note 30. 
 146. See China Panel Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 7.751–7.755, 8.2. A film executive 
claimed that China Film Group Corp. took an enormous cut of box office receipts, and 
charged film studios high distribution fees, thus limiting the profitability of American 
studios to a small percentage of the Chinese box office. The film executive hoped this 
ruling would increase competition in the distribution of films, allowing studios to take a 
larger percentage of the box office in China. John W. Miller, Peter Fritsch & Lauren A.E. 
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that these restrictions violated China’s obligations under GATT, GATS, 
and under their Accession Protocol,147 and may mean that foreign movie 
studios, publishers, and record companies will have an increased chance 
to sell more directly to Chinese consumers.148 
In its response to the allegations, China did not invoke its rights arising 
under the UNESCO Convention as a direct defense.149 The language of 
Article 20 clearly seems to preclude parties from invoking rights under 
the Convention as a defense against a breach of obligations arising under 
existing international law,150 and China’s decision not to invoke the Con-
vention as a direct defense seems to indicate that Article 20 will dissuade 
states from even attempting to argue that the Convention overrides clear 
and existing obligations when they are in conflict.151 
However, China’s response to the allegations and the Panel’s decision 
suggests that the UNESCO Convention may still alter the rights and ob-
ligations of parties to the WTO when the scope of those rights and obli-
gations are unclear.152 In response to the claims that China violated trade 
obligations arising under the Accession Protocol, China raised Article 
XX(a) of the GATT 1994 as a defense.153 Article XX(a) provides that, 
“nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
endorsement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to pro-
tect public morals.”154 
China argued that the regulations being challenged by the U.S. were 
actually part of a content review system performed on imported cultural 
products that was designed to prevent the dissemination of products that 
could have a negative impact on public morals.155 As part of this system, 
China only allowed entities which were capable of conducting the con-
                                                                                                                                     
Schuker, Hollywood Upstages Beijing: WTO Hands China Its Biggest Defeat in Trade 
Battle Over Movies, Music, Books, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2009, at A1. 
 147. See China Panel Report, supra note 27, ¶ 8.2. In line with earlier decisions, China 
did not focus on the “like products” analysis when making its arguments. However, this 
may be because this case focused on the restrictions China placed on foreign companies, 
and not on restrictions directly placed on the products. See id. 
 148. See Bradsher, supra note 30. 
 149. See China Panel Report, supra note 27, ¶ 7.758 n.538. 
 150. Id. ¶ 4.207. As the Panel noted in a footnote, “We observe in this respect that 
China has not invoked the Declaration as a defence to its breaches of trading rights 
commitments under the Accession Protocol.” Id. ¶ 7.758. 
 151. See id. It remains unclear whether other forums of international law, such as the 
International Court of Justice, would be more receptive to a direct invocation of the 
UNESCO Convention. 
 152. See id. ¶¶ 4.108–4.112, 4.207, 7.751–7.755. 
 153. See id. ¶¶ 7.708–7.709. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. ¶¶ 4.277–4.278. 
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tent review to import cultural goods, and only a limited number of im-
portation entities had the appropriate organizational structure and geo-
graphical coverage, as well as reliable and qualified personnel, necessary 
to conduct the content review.156 Despite its codification in GATT 1994, 
the “public morals” defense had previously been invoked by a state only 
once at the WTO,157 and thus, its exact scope remains unclear. In making 
its arguments, China attempted to invoke the language and spirit of the 
UNESCO Convention to broaden the scope of the previously dormant 
defense.158 
When states invoke the protection of public morals as a defense, they 
must actually show that there is a link between the policy objective be-
hind the challenged measures and the protection of public morals.159 In 
US—Gambling, the sole invocation of the public morals defense, the 
Panel first analyzed whether the policy objectives behind various internet 
gambling statutes in the U.S. fell within the scope of the protection of 
public morals.160 The Panel eventually did accept the U.S.’s arguments 
that the laws in dispute were actually measures to protect “public morals 
                                                                                                                                     
 156. See id. ¶¶ 4.278–4.279. The United States responded, “Restricting trading rights 
to only a single, or a select few, Chinese state-owned importers is nowhere near ‘indis-
pensable’ to content review, and thus the restrictions on trading rights are not ‘necessary’ 
under Article XX(a).” Id. ¶ 4.318. 
 157. Nicolas F. Diebold, The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing 
the Toothless Tiger and the Undermining Mole, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 43, 44–45. As 
Diebold notes, the defense was unsuccessfully invoked by the United States in US—
Gambling, but writing in March 2008, Diebold accurately predicted that China was likely 
to invoke the defense in the current case. Id. 
 158. See China Panel Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 4.108–4.109. 
 159. See id. ¶¶ 7.762–7.763. Writing before the China Panel Report was issued, 
Diebold said that WTO dispute settlement practice applied a two tier test to determine 
whether Article XX (or the similar Article XIV of GATS) is available as a defense. First, 
states must show that the measure at stake is designed to pursue a policy objective that 
falls within the scope of one of the public interests set out in Article XX, and the 
measures are necessary to achieve the policy objective. Second, states must show that 
they satisfy the good faith requirements set forth by the general exception clause. 
Diebold, supra note 157, at 46–47. However, when analyzing the general exceptions 
clause, WTO panels sometimes do not even mention some elements, either because dif-
ferent elements can be so closely linked or so obvious that they are not even worth men-
tioning. Id. at 47. This can make analysis of the Panel’s decision confusing, to say the 
least. 
 160. See Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Gam-
bling Panel Report]. The Panel did find that the concerns which the various statutes 
sought to address did fall within the scope of public morals, but found that the measures 
were not necessary to protect public morals. Id. 
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or public order.”161 However, as Antigua wisely noted, because of the 
wide availability of gambling and the active role of federal and state 
governments in the promotion of gambling, the U.S. could not credibly 
argue that gambling itself was contrary to public morals and public or-
der.162 Instead, in order to make this link, the U.S. had to identify sec-
ondary concerns that the various statutes were addressing, such as orga-
nized crime, money laundering, fraud, the risks of children gambling, 
and pathological gambling.163 They then had the burden of providing ev-
idence, such as legislative history, that showed that these various statutes 
were actually enacted for the purpose of addressing these specific con-
cerns.164 
Yet, in its attempt to show that its intended policy objectives fell with-
in scope of the protection of public morals, China mostly ignored any 
specific concerns it had with the cultural products being reviewed, and 
instead explicitly invoked the Convention to proclaim that cultural goods 
necessarily have an effect on public and individual morals.165 In its oral 
statement at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, China further 
elaborated 
As vectors of identity, values and meaning, cultural goods play an es-
sential role in the evolution and definition of elements such as societal 
features, values, ways of living together, ethics and behaviours. Cultur-
al goods may have a negative impact on public morals, such as the de-
piction or vindication of violence or pornography, against which mi-
nors must be specifically protected.166 
Although China does not explicitly cite it, the language clearly refer-
ences another UNESCO instrument, the Universal Declaration of Cultur-
                                                                                                                                     
 161. Id. ¶ 6.481. The Appellate Body, without much analysis, upheld the Panel’s find-
ing that the challenged measures fell within the scope of “public morals” or “public or-
der.” Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Sup-
ply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 296–299, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) 
[hereinafter U.S. Gambling Appellate Report]. 
 162. U.S. Gambling Panel Report, supra note 160, ¶ 3.290. 
 163. The suppression of these activities would constitute the policy objective. 
 164. See id. Diebold listed various means of proving whether specific policy objectives 
fall within the scope of public morals, including international practice and consensus, 
national laws and international agreements, and possibly religious texts. Diebold, supra 
note 157, at 64–66. 
 165. See China Panel Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 4.108–4.109. China argued, “The cul-
tural goods have a major impact on societal and individual morals as emphasized in par-
ticular in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions.” Id. 
 166. See id. ¶ 4.276. 
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al Diversity (“the UNESCO Declaration”).167 The UNESCO Declaration 
describes “cultural goods and services” as “vectors of identity, values, 
and meaning,” and that they “must not be treated as mere commodities or 
consumer goods.”168 
China further argued, 
Considering the potential impact of cultural goods on public morals, 
China’s longstanding policy has been to implement a high level of pro-
tection which is reflected in a complete prohibition of cultural goods 
with inappropriate content and a high level of protection against the 
possible dissemination of cultural goods with a content that could have 
a negative impact on public morals.169 
In declining to elaborate on its specific concerns regarding the content of 
the cultural goods subject to the challenged measures, failing to describe 
how this content threatened public morals, and speaking only in an in-
credibly broad sense about the effect of cultural goods on public morals, 
China implicitly invoked the themes of sovereignty over cultural matters 
that permeate throughout the UNESCO Convention.170 
Both the responses of the U.S. and of the Panel to China’s arguments 
seem to indicate that future WTO panels will not question the link be-
tween cultural products and public morals.171 It is notable that the U.S., 
unlike Antigua and Barbuda in US—Gambling, did not even contest the 
link between the content of the cultural goods and the protection of pub-
lic morals.172 While Antigua and Barbuda were able to make the credible 
argument that the significant consumption of gambling and betting ser-
vices within the nation raised the question of whether internet gambling 
was actually contrary to public morals in the U.S.,173 the U.S. chose not 
to dispute whether all of China’s content prohibitions actually protected 
public morals in China.174 
                                                                                                                                     
 167. See Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity, Nov. 2, 2001, UNESCO Doc. 
31C/RES/25, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf. 
 168. Id. art. 8. Although there is language similar to this in the Convention, China may 
have chosen to cite the UNESCO Declaration because the United States had adopted the 
Declaration, but not the Convention. 
 169. China Panel Report, supra note 27, ¶ 4.277. 
 170. See id. ¶¶ 4.108–4.109, 4.276–4.277. 
 171. See id. ¶ 7.763. 
 172. See id. ¶¶ 7.756, 7.762. As the Panel noted, “The United States does not specifi-
cally argue that the measures at issue are not measures to protect public morals. The 
United States is challenging the means China has chosen to achieve its objective of pro-
tecting public morals.” Id. ¶ 7.756. 
 173. Id. ¶ 7.762. 
 174. Id. 
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Yet, some of the types of content prohibited under the Chinese regula-
tions in dispute are incredibly broad.175 Under the Publications Regula-
tions, China’s main statute laying forth how it applies content review to 
reading materials, China did put forth some specific content that its con-
tent review system prevented from entering the marketplace that would 
be unlikely to raise many objections, such as depictions of violence and 
pornography.176 However, other provisions strongly suggest that China 
could apply protectionist measures protecting culture under the guise of 
the public morals defense.177 Objectionable content includes content that: 
“jeopardizes the solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
nation,” “incites hatred or discrimination of the nationalities, undermines 
the solidarity of the nationalities or infringes upon customs and habits of 
the nationalities,” and “jeopardizes social morality or fine cultural tradi-
tions of the nationalities.”178 These provisions define content not by ob-
jective measures,179 but rather by the effect it may have on individuals or 
the nation as a whole.180 In defining prohibited content in such a circular 
manner, China could plausibly argue that any American cultural product 
that threatened the market share of Chinese cultural products “jeopardiz-
es the solidarity” of the nation, or “threatens the cultural traditions of the 
nationalities.”181 
Because the Panel found that China’s measures did not satisfy the ne-
cessity test of Article XX, they chose to proceed with their analysis on 
the assumption that each of the prohibited types of content could have a 
negative impact on “public morals” in China.182 While this decision may 
be partially based on the strategic decision not to specifically contest the 
provisions detailing the prohibited content, the Panel also noted that the 
content and scope of the concept of “public morals” played a role in their 
decision.183 
The Panel accepted the interpretation of public morals, laid out in US—
Gambling, that “the term ‘public morals’ denotes standards of right and 
                                                                                                                                     
 175. See China Panel Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 7.760–7.761. 
 176. See id. ¶ 7.760. However, this is not to suggest that states might not object to 
discriminatory applications of those provisions against foreign materials. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. While there may be some obvious difficulties in demarcating the exact point 
where depictions of nudity or sexual intercourse become pornographic, any analysis 
would at least be based on the actual content of the cultural product. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. ¶ 7.763. 
 183. Id. ¶ 7.763. 
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wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation,”184 
and that these concepts can vary throughout time and in different places, 
depending on factors such as prevailing social, cultural, ethical, and reli-
gious values.185 Most importantly, the Panel noted that when applying the 
public morals concept and other similar societal concepts, member states 
“should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the con-
cepts of public morals . . . in their respective territories, according to 
their own systems and scales of values.”186 The implicit recognition of 
state sovereignty over matters of public morals echoes the themes of the 
UNESCO Convention and seems to suggest that future WTO panels 
would be extremely reluctant to question a state’s assessment of its own 
public morals.187 
The cultural value of a product may also have an impact on a WTO 
panel’s analysis of the necessity test. Once the panel determines that the 
challenged measures are designed to protect public morals, the chal-
lenged measures must still be determined to be “necessary” to protect 
public morals.188 In US—Gambling, the Panel looked to three factors to 
determine whether the challenged measures met this standard: (1) the 
importance of the interests or values that these Acts are intended to pro-
tect; (2) the extent to which these Acts contribute to the realization of the 
end respectively pursued by these Acts; and (3) the respective trade im-
pact of these Acts.189 
The idea of state sovereignty over cultural products underlying the 
UNESCO Convention may have an important impact upon the first of 
these factors: the importance of the interests or values that the Acts are 
intended to protect.190 With only a brief discussion, the panel embraced 
China’s position that the preservation of public morals represents a cru-
cial policy objective for states, and that it forms “a central element of 
social cohesion and the capacity of communities to live together.”191 The 
Panel also noted that the U.S. did not indicate any objection to China’s 
position regarding the importance of public morals as a state interest.192 
The Panel concluded, 
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In our view, it is undoubtedly the case that the protections of public 
morals ranks among the most important values of or interests pursued 
by Members as a matter of public policy. We do not consider it simply 
accident that the exception relating to ‘public moral’ is the first excep-
tion identified in the ten sub-paragraphs of Article XX. We therefore 
concur that the protection of public morals is a highly important value 
or interest.193 
Because the WTO approach includes weighing and balancing the as-
sessment of the relative importance of the interests pursued by the state 
against other factors,194 the Panel’s strong language regarding public 
morals may be an important factor in future disputes. 
Even in rejecting China’s particular plan for protecting public morals, 
the Panel endorsed state sovereignty over cultural matters.195 When in-
voking the public morals defense, WTO members are obliged to consider 
all reasonably available alternatives that are WTO-consistent before im-
posing a WTO-inconsistent measure.196 The Panel accepted the U.S. pro-
posal that the Chinese government could perform the content review 
themselves instead of the import companies.197 The Panel stated, “We see 
no reason to believe that the alternative in question would be inherently 
WTO-inconsistent or that it could not be implemented by China in a 
WTO-consistent manner.”198 This suggests that it is only China’s re-
strictions on which entities are legally allowed to import cultural goods 
that are inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations.199 An exhaustive 
content review performed by the Chinese government would seem to be 
consistent with WTO law.200 
Because WTO members are given great latitude in defining and apply-
ing the concept of public morals,201 this decision seems to grant vast 
powers to states to regulate cultural goods. While the inherent difficulty 
of analyzing culture worked to the advantage of the U.S. in cases in 
which panels performed a “like products” analysis, this case suggests 
that it will work to the advantage of states seeking to invoke the public 
morals defense of Article XX.202 
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CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the interplay between the UNESCO Convention and 
WTO case law is certainly not meant to suggest that trade obligations 
have been rendered moot by the UNESCO Convention. WTO case law 
and interpretation is extraordinarily complex, and each individual case 
involves so many variables that making specific predictions with regards 
to the development of trade law is impossible. Rather, this Note argues 
that the very complexity of WTO case law makes the current U.S. policy 
of resisting any possible recognition of the cultural exception incredibly 
risky. 
The interests of the U.S. would be better served by dropping its fierce 
resistance to the cultural exception. The U.S. should engage with the in-
ternational community to develop a WTO provision that clearly defines 
when the cultural exception is applicable and, when applicable, what ac-
ceptable measures states may take to protect domestic culture. Continu-
ing its quixotic battle would only needlessly antagonize the global com-
munity, and in light of the overwhelming worldwide popularity of the 
cultural exception, any victory the U.S. might win at the WTO could 
damage the trade regime’s legitimacy. 
In exchange for supporting the codification of the cultural exception at 
the WTO, the U.S. should press for a cultural exception with a limited 
scope, based solely on the medium by which the product is transmitted 
and without regard to the cultural value of the product. The U.S. should 
propose that international trade law make a distinction between content 
that is publicly displayed and content that is consumed individually. Pub-
licly displayed content would be defined as content that is communicated 
to multiple people simultaneously. This would include films at movie 
theaters, which are projected to consumers in a public place; television 
programming, which is broadcast to many viewers simultaneously; radio 
programming, likewise broadcast over the airwaves; and any live per-
formance. For content that is publicly displayed, states should be allowed 
both to subsidize production and to place limited quotas on the amount of 
non-domestic productions. For example, states would be allowed to place 
a quota on the amount of foreign films that can be shown in theaters, but 
that quota may not be placed any higher than fifty percent. Such 
measures would allow states to ensure the continued production of do-
mestic cultural content, but would not exclude foreign productions from 
the marketplace. 
For content that is consumed individually, there should be fewer WTO 
acceptable restrictions. This would include CDs, DVDs, and content 
transmitted over the internet. Since the actual content would often over-
lap within these two categories, states would still be able to subsidize the 
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production of content for this category. However, the ability to exclude 
content from the marketplace would be greatly diminished under interna-
tional law. For instance, while states would be able to place quotas on the 
amount of foreign films that can be released in theaters, they would not 
be able to place such a restriction on the availability of foreign films for 
downloading over the internet or in multimedia stores. This would pro-
tect the ability of consumers to seek out particular foreign content. 
The U.S. could better achieve its policy objectives of opening the 
global marketplace for its entertainment industry by engaging with the 
international community to codify a limited version of the cultural excep-
tion in the WTO agreements. Current U.S. policy, while showing some 
signs of success in WTO litigation, carries far too much risk. When a 
policy isolates a nation from its friends as well as enemies and fails to 
achieve its objectives, it may be wise to rethink that policy. The time has 
come for the U.S. to recognize the cultural exception. 
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